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SUMMARYEurope’s banks have long been slow to integrate across borders,
but this is changing fast. ‘Pan-European banks’, whose activities span
several EU countries, are rapidly emerging, and are likely to enhance
the overall contribution of financial services to economic growth.
Meanwhile, financial stability arrangements, notably banking super-
vision,remain nationally anchored. This creates significant risks in the
event of a crisis involving a pan-European bank. Faulty cross-border co-
ordination and diverging national views could seriously hamper the ability
of the authorities to respond speedily and effectively to an unfolding
financial crisis.
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Recent turmoil in credit markets under-
scores the importance of proper manage-
ment of financial crises. The emergence of
pan-European banks requires a reform of
Europe’s financial stability arrangements,
in which the guiding principle should be
the minimisation of potential collective
crisis costs to Europeans. Important 
elements of the financial stability frame-
work can no longer best be organised
through voluntary coordination among
national authorities. A two-tier framework,
including new EU-level arrangements and
institutions focused on pan-European
banks, would address this situation while
being consistent with the subsidiarity
principle. Given the significant technical
and political obstacles, strong commit-
ment at the highest level will be required
to make meaningful progress.
Aggregate European assets of 
the EU's 15 largest listed banks
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IS EUROPE READY FOR  A MAJOR BANKING CRISIS?
EUROPE’S banking sector is one of
its biggest industries. Banks
represent almost a quarter of the
aggregate market capitalisation of
Europe’s 100 largest listed compa-
nies, and form by far the largest
sector by this measure of value
(Table 1). They are the backbone of
the financial sector, which ensures
the connection between providers
and users of capital, and is a crucial
enabler of corporate expansion or
restructuring and household
consumption and investment. A
growing body of evidence indica-
tes that financial development is
essential to economic growth
1.
Financial integration can be a
major driver of financial develop-
ment and offers direct economic
benefits, permitting economies of
scale and greater risk-sharing bet-
ween countries, and allowing capi-
tal to be allocated across borders
to the most productive uses
2.
Banks are heavily regulated, and
one major reason for this is syste-
mic risk. Banks’ balance sheets
are highly leveraged and strongly
tied together. If one bank defaults,
it can impact the whole sector.
Furthermore, trust in the financial
1See Ross Levine,
‘Finance and
Growth: Theory and
Evidence’, in
Handbook of
Economic Growth, 
edited by Philippe
Aghion and Steven
Durlauf, Elsevier
Science (2005).
2See chapter 2 of 
Jörg Decressin,
Hamid Faruqee and
Wim Fonteyne (eds),
Integrating Europe’s
Financial Markets,
International
Monetary Fund
(September 2007).
Table 1: Banking, a major European industry
Industry
No. in top 100
European listed
companies
% Europe’s top 100
total market
capitalisation
Banks 22 24%
Oil, gas & mining 11 17%
Manufacturing & business services 20 15%
Consumer products & services 14 11%
Energy & water utilities 10 10%
Life sciences 6 9%
Telecoms & media 9 8%
Insurance 8 6%
Total 100 100%
Table 2: The relative parochialism of Europe’s banking industry 
Sectoral breakdown of Europe’s 
top 100 listed companies
Average
internationalisation rate*
Average
Europeanisation rate**
Life sciences 91% 84%
Consumer products & services 84% 74%
Manufacturing & business services 80% 66%
Oil, gas & mining 70% 57%
Insurance 66% 53%
Energy & water utilities 46% 31%
Banking 44% 27%
Telecoms & media 36% 24%
Average all sectors 62% 49%
Each company in the top 100 is allocated a ‘headquarters zone’, depending on the location of its main opera-
tional headquarters, among the following: Nordic, UK & Ireland, Benelux, Germany, Switzerland, France, Spain
& Portugal, Italy.     * Internationalisation rate = sales outside the headquarters zone/total sales.
** Europeanisation rate = European sales outside the headquarters zone/total European sales.
Source: Based on Nicolas Véron, Farewell National Champions, Bruegel Policy Brief 2006/04, June 2006.
taking early corrective action
toward financial institutions and
by supplying markets with liqui-
dity when needed (crisis preven-
tion); making sure that banking
crises, if and when they occur, do
not result in widespread financial
devastation (crisis management);
and  handling the aftermath of
such crises by allowing the orderly
exit of failed institutions and ade-
quate protection of banking clients 
(crisis resolution), a process that
history suggests often implies the
use of taxpayers’ money.   
1. THE ACCELERATING 
INTEGRATION OF EUROPE’S 
BANKING SYSTEM 
Europe benefits from London’s
world-class wholesale capital mar-
ket and has many world-class
financial services firms. But its
banking industry has long been –
and still is – remarkably fragmen-
ted. European financial services
firms represent a respectable 36
percent of the aggregate value of
companies in the FT global 500
ranking of the world’s largest listed
corporations. But the only
system is a crucial public good
that justifies public intervention,
including banking regulation and
supervision, and the provision of
collective insurance of bank depo-
sits. Past systemic banking crises,
most dramatically those of the
1930s, showed the dire conse-
quences of a collapse of public
trust. Therefore, governments,
central banks and specialised
agencies have a mandate to moni-
tor and minimise risk in the finan-
cial system, including through
Source: Bruegel estimates based on FT global 500 ranking, end-June 2007 (www.ft.com).
N.B.: This table includes only listed firms, and does not take into account important European players such
as savings and cooperative banks or Germany’s Landesbanken. However, a 2006 study by McKinsey indica-
tes that including non-listed entities in the list of Europe’s 30 largest banks would increase their cumulated
value by only 13 percent: see Financial Times, ‘FT Non-Public 150’, 14 December 2006.IS EUROPE READY FOR  A MAJOR BANKING CRISIS?
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3Integrating Europe’s
Financial Market, 
chapter 2, box 2.1 
(see note 2).
4Integrating Europe’s
Financial Market, 
chapter 4 (see note 2).
5Emilio Botin, ‘The most
profitable course for
Europe’s banks’,
Financial Times, 
22 January 2004.
European player in the financial
sector’s worldwide top 10 is HSBC
– which, incidentally, was incorpo-
rated in Hong Kong until 1994, and
whose activity is mostly outside
the EU. In no other broad sector are
so few European companies repre-
sented at the top. Furthermore, as
Table 2 illustrates, Europe’s banks
are more concentrated on their
‘home’ market than any other
industry save telecoms and media
– a segment in which most com-
panies (eight out of eleven) were
national monopolies only a few
years ago but are now internatio-
nalising rapidly. These features
may exact a high price on the per-
formance of the financial system
and the economy as a whole.
Financial services (excluding insu-
rance) accounted for half the gap
in productivity growth between the
euro area and the US between
1996 and 2003
3. Europe’s banks
also seem to be both less profita-
ble than their US counterparts, and
less prone to take risk in lending to
certain types of local borrowers,
with the possible consequence of
more difficult funding for high-
growth, capital-hungry innovative
companies
4. 
However, cross-border banking
integration is gaining momentum
and changing this picture rapidly.
A first wave of consolidation, in the
1990s and early 2000s, had pre-
dominantly involved banks within
the same country or in neighbou-
ring countries. Emilio Botín, chair-
man of Grupo Santander, expres-
sed a collective mood when writing
that ‘it will be some time before
Europe is sufficiently integrated
and the many barriers – regulatory,
fiscal and cultural – that impede
the functioning of the single market
are overcome. Many would still
regard as unacceptable the take-
over of a large local bank by a
foreign institution. [...] I doubt
[cross-border deals] would create
value for shareholders’
5. But a few
months later, Santander success-
fully acquired Abbey in the UK, ini-
tiating a new series of landmark
cross-border deals which includes
UniCredit’s purchase of HVB
(2005) and the ongoing battle for
ABN Amro, in which Santander is a
contender. Table 3 illustrates the
speed with which the distribution
of the assets of Europe’s main
banks has evolved towards more
geographical diversification inside
the EU, while the share of assets
outside the EU has remained sta-
ble at roughly a quarter of the total. 
Further integration is likely, per-
haps at an accelerating pace.
Barriers to foreign investment in
banking are falling, not least
Table 3: Europe’s largest banks are crossing borders
Europe’s 15 largest listed
banks (by decreasing
order of market value)
Home
country
Assets in home
country (1997)
Assets in the rest
of Europe (1997)
Assets in home
country (2006)
Assets in the rest
of Europe (2006)
HSBC UK 35% 4% 27% 12%
RBS UK 81% 1% 68% 7%
Santander ES 55% 8% 26% 58%
BNP Paribas FR 53% (a) 19% (a) 58% 20%
ING (b) NL 55% 11% 23% 16%
UniCredit IT 77% (c) 17% (c) 26% 70%
Barclays UK 71% 8% 41% 20%
ABN Amro NL 38% 15% 29% 43%
Intesa Sanpaolo IT 70% (a) 15% (a) 84% 8%
BBVA ES 85% (d) 3% (d) 61% 9%
Société Générale (b) FR 80% 7% 54% 27%
Deutsche Bank DE 32% 35% 18% 47%
HBOS UK 83% (e) 8% (e) 85% 9%
Crédit Agricole FR 88% 3% 77% 13%
Lloyds TSB UK 86% 5% 95% 2%
Average (unweighted) 66% 11% 51% 24%
Average (asset-weighted) 60% 13% 48% 24%
Source: Bruegel estimates based on company information.  Notes: (a) 1999 (1997 data unavailable); (b) breakdown by income (asset data unavailable for 1997);
(c) Credito Italiano; (d) Banco Bilbao Vizcaya; (e) Bank of Scotland. b
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IS EUROPE READY FOR  A MAJOR BANKING CRISIS?
thanks to the European
Commission’s vigorous defence of
a competitive internal market, in
successive cases involving
Portugal (1999), Germany
(2004), Italy (2005) and Poland
(2006). At the same time, new
financial products, especially
asset-backed securities, have
developed in Europe at a rapid
pace, as illustrated by Figure 1. In
spite of recent credit market tur-
moil, the growth of European secu-
ritisation is unlikely to be halted,
as this financial technique brings
genuine risk-management effi-
ciency gains. This trend and other
technological developments pro-
vide additional incentives for
banks to seek economies of scale
and centrally manage operations
that take place in different coun-
tries. As a result, there will be a
growing number of banks whose
activities are not predominantly
taking place in one single country.
These are called ‘pan-European
banks’ in the rest of this text, even
though some may not have a pre-
sence in all European countries. 
Cross-border banking integration
could bring important economic
benefits. Pan-European banks pro-
vide a link between national finan-
cial systems and the highly efficient
wholesale capital markets of
London and smaller European
hubs, as well as global capital mar-
kets. This has the potential to bring
more dynamic financial develop-
ment and a quicker spread of
financial innovation, facilitate
access to credit for consumers and
entrepreneurial firms, and ultima-
tely improve the ability of Europe’s
financial system to foster growth.  
2. NATIONAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY ARRANGEMENTS 
ARE ILL-ADAPTED TO PAN-
EUROPEAN BANKS
While pan-European banks are
emerging, Europe’s financial stabi-
lity arrangements remain groun-
ded at the national level. They now
run the risk of lagging behind mar-
ket developments. 
Much headway has certainly been
made in giving national financial
stability arrangements
a European orienta-
tion. The European
Commission’s 1999
Financial Services
Action Plan put in
place a largely harmo-
nised set of financial
regulations. The so-called
Lamfalussy framework for finan-
cial rule-making complemented
this with a structure intended to
implement these regulations
consistently and adapt them over
time, while reinforcing market
consultation. In the banking sec-
tor, it brings together all European
banking supervisors and relevant
agencies within the Committee of
European Banking Supervisors
(CEBS), established in 2004. To
improve cross-border cooperation
between existing national agen-
cies, an extensive network of bila-
teral ‘memorandums of understan-
ding’ (MoUs) has been built since
the late 1980s, complemented
more recently with multilateral
MoUs on information sharing
during a crisis and on specific ban-
king groups. But the interlocking of
many national sources of autho-
rity has also created complexity
and blurred the lines of responsibi-
lity for supervision and crisis
management. CEBS is an advisory
body, with no decision-making
powers. The MoUs are non-binding,
and their effectiveness has yet to
be tested by a crisis. The European
Central Bank (ECB), established in
1998, has no supervisory man-
date and, apart from its responsi-
bility for open-market operations,
its only financial stability task is a
monitoring role, supported by the
ECB’s Banking Supervision
Committee. 
The prudential framework for pan-
European banks has become a
maze of national
authorities (51 are
members of CEBS
alone), EU-level
committees (no
fewer than nine)
and bilateral arran-
gements (some 80
recently mentioned by European
Commissioner Charlie McCreevy)
6.
Prudential fragmentation imposes
costs on the financial system. One
recent study estimates that the
resulting absence of scale econo-
mies adds 15 percent to the cost
of Europe’s banking supervision
7.
Additional costs are created as
banks need to cope with different
requirements and reporting sys-
tems in each country. 
But these supervisory costs are of
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Figure 1: Securitisation issuance 
in Europe and the US (in % of GDP)
6Keynote address 
at the conference
on EU supervisory
arrangements in
Brussels, 26 June
2007
(www.europa.eu).
7Martin Schüler and
Friedrich Heinemann,
The Costs of
Supervisory
Fragmentation
in Europe, ZEW
Discussion Paper No.
05-01 (2005).
‘The interlocking 
of many national 
authorities has 
blurred the lines of 
responsibility.’IS EUROPE READY FOR  A MAJOR BANKING CRISIS?
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8Jerry Green and 
Jean-Jacques Laffont,
Incentives in Public
Decision Making, 
North-Holland (1979).
9Financial Services
Committee Report on
Financial Supervision
(23 February 2006).
secondary importance compared
to the risks related to an inade-
quate response to major crises. No
national or European authority
presently has routine access to
supervisory information on all
pan-European banks, and in-depth
knowledge of their
developments. EU
countries’ existing
tools are no longer ade-
quate to contain the
impact of financial cri-
ses in ways that mini-
mise collective costs
and avoid ‘moral
hazard’ (ie precedents
that encourage imprudent beha-
viour by financial players, inclu-
ding banks). 
The effects of financial integration
are most advanced in the coun-
tries that joined the EU in 2004 and
2007, in which the banking system
is dominated by foreign-headquar-
tered institutions (Figure 2).
Elsewhere, the influence of non-
domestic banks is also increasing
as cross-border activity gathers
pace. As banks increasingly cen-
tralise key business functions
such as risk, liquidity and asset-
liability management, local bran-
ches or subsidiaries become less
independent from the rest of the
group. As a consequence, national
authorities increasingly lose leve-
rage over the main banks in their
jurisdictions, and their ability to
deal with financial crisis situations
on a national basis is diminished. 
If problems emerge in a pan-
European bank, there are no
agreed rules on early intervention
and remedial action. Because of
different interests or a different
assessment of risks, different
national authorities may have dif-
ferent priorities, the more so as the
crisis becomes acute. Speed, crucial
in handling crises, might be ham-
pered by coordination difficulties,
compounded by the lack of agree-
ment between countries on the
role (if any) public funding should
play in crisis resolution, and on the
division of tasks
between supervi-
sors in ‘home’
(headquarters)
and ‘host’ (local)
jurisdictions. At
every step, agree-
ment may take so
long to reach that it
might be overta-
ken by events on the ground, with
consequent increases in the cost
of any remedies. 
If a bank’s insolvency becomes a
realistic scenario, minds will focus
on the possible public cost of crisis
resolution, which has been a factor
in past crises, and countries will
act to minimise losses to their own
citizens. They may seek advan-
tage by withholding information or
otherwise delaying cooperation.
Host countries may try to ‘ring-
fence’ subsidiaries or branches
and limit their operational free-
dom, to prevent higher-quality
assets from leaving the country or
additional liabilities being impo-
sed on the local level. In doing so,
they may compound difficulties
and prevent solutions at the group
level. Conversely, home authorities
may be unwilling to spend their
taxpayers’ money for the benefit of
depositors in host countries, or
lack the capacity to do so.
Depositors may have to face the
consequences of decisions made
by foreign authorities, who are not
accountable to them and will be
naturally suspected of being pri-
marily concerned about their own
citizens’ interests. 
The economic literature on ‘mecha-
nism design’ suggests that in such
situations, national priorities will
be incompatible with minimisation
of the overall collective cost
8. In
such dire events, non-binding
supervisory MoUs or voluntary
mediation mechanisms (as
recommended by the ‘Francq
report’ of February 2006
9) may
not have much impact when wei-
ghed against the potency of natio-
nal mandates. Crises are known to
require concentration of responsi-
bility, but in the absence of clear
ex ante cross-border arrange-
ments, it is unlikely that any
authority, national or European,
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Figure 2: The gradual demise of ‘national banking systems’
Share of foreign-owned banks (in percent of total assets)
‘In crisis situations,
national priorities
will be incompatible
with minimisation 
of the overall 
collective cost.’IS EUROPE READY FOR  A MAJOR BANKING CRISIS?
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10Louis Pauly, Political
Authority and Global
Finance: Crisis
Prevention in
Europe and Beyond,
Global Economic
Governance
Working Paper 
WP 2007/34,
Oxford University 
(May 2007).
could emerge as an ‘honest broker’
to represent the common interest.
As Louis Pauly from the University
of Toronto put it recently, ‘the
belief that financial institutions
and national regulators will volun-
tarily and automatically collabo-
rate to an adequate extent in the
face of a financial panic and in the
absence of central coordination
seems a classic example of wish-
ful thinking. Where is the historical
evidence that could justify it?’
Neither the Economic and
Financial  Committee, which brings
together the EU’s finance minis-
tries, nor the ECB, nor the
Commission are likely to prove able
to ‘provide the necessary services
of multilateral coordination and
political buffering’
10. As a result,
significant and unnecessary los-
ses of taxpayers’ money would be
likely, and this money may be
spent in ways that create moral
hazard among Europe’s banks. 
No real precedent exists for a
major cross-border banking failure,
except perhaps the unhappy expe-
rience in 1991 when BCCI was clo-
sed down in London. Nonetheless,
recent turmoil in credit markets
has reminded the European public
of the permanent possibility of
financial crises, and of the inabi-
lity of national borders to keep
them at bay. Financial innovation
and global integration not only dis-
tribute default risk – which, all
things equal, tends to strengthen
the system – but also create new
risks of their own, including those
linked to the increase in common
exposures across systems, which
could make crises even more
s e v e r e  w h e n  t h e y  o c c u r .  A s  t h e
examples listed in Table 4 illus-
trate, recent banking crises in the
developed world have often resul-
ted in major damage, both in terms
of direct fiscal costs related to
managing the crisis and loss of
economic activity (the numbers
remain high under any valuation
methodology). More remote
memories, including those of the
1930s in Europe and the United
States, underscore the fact that
disruption in the financial system,
if not properly managed, has
severe social and political as well
as economic consequences. 
3. A TWO-TIER FINANCIAL 
STABILITY FRAMEWORK
Given the deficiencies of the sta-
tus quo and the potentially severe
impact of crises involving pan-
European banks, an overhaul of
Europe’s financial stability arran-
gements is overdue. Arrangements
are needed that deliver solutions
to crises that minimise crisis-indu-
ced collective losses at the
European level – while remaining
compatible with continued finan-
cial development, including finan-
cial integration and innovation. 
Handling crises involving pan-
European banks efficiently and
effectively is only possible when
supervisory information can travel
across borders confidentially but
freely; efficient structures are in
place that allow quick decisions
involving multiple countries and
agencies; sufficient operational
flexibility is possible to deal with
the unique nature of each crisis; all
involved decision-makers share
common basic views on how to
proceed; and individual and insti-
tutional incentives are sufficiently
aligned for decisions to serve the
collective interest. 
Relying on increasingly complex
arrangements for voluntary coope-
ration among national financial
stability frameworks is unlikely to
deliver on these requirements,
What they said about Europe’s current stability arrangements
‘The present institutional setup in Europe regarding crisis prevention (and potentially also 
crisis management) looks to me, to put it mildly, sub-optimal.’
Alexandre Lamfalussy, 2nd Pierre Werner Lecture delivered at the Central bank of
Luxembourg, 26 October 2004 (www.bcl.lu).
‘Generally, the framework for financial supervision in the EU remains highly fragmented and
overregulated, and therefore inefficient and ineffective.’
European Financial Services Round Table, On the Lead Supervisor Model and the Future of
Financial Supervision in the EU, June 2005 (www.efr.be) .
‘The current networks of national supervisors, the supervisory arrangements, and the non-
legally binding memoranda of understanding may not be sufficient to face a major crisis 
caused by a failure of markets or important cross-border financial groups.’
European Parliament, motion of 8 May 2006 (www.europarl.europa.eu). 
‘These [Lamfalussy Level 3] Committees must demonstrate progress on [supervisory]
convergence quickly and convincingly. This means a change of mentality as well as working
methods. This is not easy. Bureaucracy and bureaucrats defend the status quo long past the
time when the quo has lost its status! Progress in this area is urgently needed.’
Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for the Internal Market, 26 June 2007 (see note 6).
‘Do the present legal frameworks provide authorities with the necessary tools for supervising
cross-border banking groups in an efficient way? And do the authorities themselves have
arrangements in place to produce comprehensive assessments of the operations and the
risks of these groups? Under the prevailing regulatory structures I am afraid that the ans-
wers to both of these questions are likely to be no.’
Stefan Ingves, Governor of Sweden’s central bank, speech at the Reserve Bank of Australia,
21 August 2007 (www.riksbank.com).IS EUROPE READY FOR  A MAJOR BANKING CRISIS?
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11Jean-Claude Trichet,
keynote speech at the
first CEBS conference in
London, 9 May 2007
(www.ecb.int).
12Charles Goodhart 
and Dirk Schoenmaker,
Burden Sharing in a
Banking Crisis in Europe,
LSE Financial Markets
Group Special Paper
Series No.164 
(March 2006).
13Integrating Europe’s
Financial Markets,
chapter 10 
(see note 2).
should be based on a single rules
book and entail EU-level responsi-
bility over some supervisory func-
tions, which could be transferred
either to one or several new or
existing agencies. To eliminate
current information asymmetries
with respect to pan-European
banks, supervisory information
would need to be centralised, with
appropriate arrangements to allow
the circulation of confidential data. 
To help ensure collective crisis
cost minimisation, a European
prudential regime should be
accompanied by a single set of
pre-crisis sanctions and tools and
specific, harmonised arrange-
ments for deposit insurance.
Bankruptcy procedures tailored to
the characteristics of pan-
European banks might also need
to be considered. Because overall
cost minimisation often tends to
be to at least one party’s disad-
vantage, it is likely to require coun-
tries to commit to sharing the
costs of crisis resolution. If well
handled ahead of time, this need
not prompt moral hazard
12. Any EU-
level arrangements should provide
the clear prospect for failing banks
to disappear as legal entities, so
as to curtail moral hazard and
strengthen banks’ incentives to
manage savings carefully
13. 
An important and difficult question
is determining to whom exactly a
European prudential regime
should apply. Filtering banks on
the basis of specific thresholds of
geographical risk diversification
and/or size may be overly rigid
and distort competition. Making
adhesion to a European regime
voluntary carries both the poten-
tial benefits and risks of regula-
tory competition, and there is no
guarantee that all pan-European
Table 4: The high cost of banking crises
Country Period Fiscal cost 
as % of GDP
Output dip 
as % of GDP
Australia 1989-92 1.9% -
Finland 1991-94 11.0% 23.1%
France 1994-95 0.7% -
Japan 1992- 20.0% 27.7%
New Zealand 1987-90 1.0% 18.5%
Norway 1987-93 8.0% 19.6%
South Korea 1997- 26.5% 16.5%
Sweden 1991-94 4.0% 6.5%
United States 1981-91 3.2% 5.4%
Source: Patrick Honohan and Daniela Klingebiel, ‘The Fiscal Cost Implications of an Accommodating Approach
to Banking Crises’, Journal of Banking & Finance27, 2003, pp. 1539-1560 (www.sciencedirect.com).
because of the practical coordina-
tion difficulties and more funda-
mentally because the interests of
the decision makers involved are
not aligned. Actions intended to
minimise collective costs are only
likely to be on offer when coopera-
tion is no longer simply voluntary,
but a core part of the mandate.  
It does not follow that all financial
stability functions need to be EU-
wide. Indeed, the subsidiarity prin-
ciple and the differen-
ces in the risks of
cross-border externa-
lities present in the
banking system sug-
gest a two-tier setup,
in which functions
are fulfilled either at the EU level or
at the national level, depending on
where this can best be done given
the objectives outlined above.
Some functions related to cross-
border crisis management ought
to be organised at least in part at
the EU level, such a way that key
decision-makers are responsible
for the common best interest, and
held accountable for safeguarding
it. In addition, combining effective
and collective-cost-minimising cri-
sis management with the objective
of allowing pan-European banks to
operate freely across borders
argues in favour of an EU-level
regulatory and supervisory (pru-
dential) regime for these banks.
Such a European prudential regime
should be effectively focused on
pan-European banks, a small sub-
sample of Europe’s 8,000-odd
banks. The European System of
Central Banks has calculated that
just 16 groups account for one
third of EU banking assets. These
groups hold on average 38 percent
of their EU assets
outside their home
countries
11. For
nationally-oriented
banks, including
most cooperative,
public and savings
banks, the benefits offered by
proximity argue for a decentralised
prudential approach based on
national supervision. 
A European prudential regime can
best be established at the level of
the entire EU rather than the euro
area, because the EU offers an
appropriate framework of law and
democratic accountability and
almost all pan-European banks
have significant activities in
London that cannot be isolated
from their euro area operations. It
‘The subsidiarity
principle suggests 
a two-tier setup.’IS EUROPE READY FOR  A MAJOR BANKING CRISIS?
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14A discussion of the
related policy choices
can be found in 
Martin Cihák and 
Jörg Decressin, 
The Case for a 
European Banking
Charter, IMF Working
Paper WP/07/173
(2007).
15On this aspect see
Adam Posen,
‘Liberalism Needs
Central Power’,
Financial Times,
4 July 2007.
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banks would join
14. A combination
of both approaches could also be
considered. 
An EU-level approach for pan-
European banks would facilitate
coordination with non-European
supervisors in the event of a crisis
that extends beyond the EU’s bor-
ders, something financial globali-
sation makes ever more likely. It
would increase
Europe’s influence
in international dis-
cussions on ban-
king. It would
reduce compliance
and opportunity
costs for pan-
European banks. It would level the
playing field on which pan-
European banks compete, whate-
ver their country of incorporation,
and may accelerate the ongoing
convergence of national-level ban-
king regulation. It could hamper
the protectionist bent of national
policies
15. And it would probably
contribute to an acceleration of
European financial integration,
with positive growth and competi-
tiveness impact. These ‘side
effects’ would not be negligible.  
Discussions about pooling deci-
sion-making and building new ins-
titutions that defend Europe’s col-
lective interest raise many legiti-
mate concerns. These include the
desire to keep institutions close to
citizens and market players; the
need for effective accountability,
especially as crisis management
may lead to using taxpayers’
money; the risks of mission creep
and unchecked overregulation;
and the risk that new institutions
may be difficult to reform if they
prove inadequate. Also, there is a
natural desire to maintain the
mandate of existing national insti-
tutions and related jobs – not to
mention other possi-
ble obstacles to
reform such as turf
protection, regulatory
capture, and institu-
tional inertia. The
European regime
should rely on exten-
sive delegation of operational
tasks to national agencies; and
arrangements on the funding,
governance and public accounta-
bility of EU-level organisations to
be involved in it will be crucial for
creating trust and legitimacy.
Under current arrangements, EU
citizens are subject to decisions of
foreign authorities that are not at
all accountable to them. The two-
tier framework would thus restore
accountability in an area where it
is currently not provided. 
Given the magnitude of the chal-
lenges, an ‘evolutionary’ approach,
based on consensus-building
among national agencies, is unli-
kely to deliver. Political commit-
ment at the highest level will be
needed, as has been the case for
previous major European reforms.
The severe potential impact of ina-
dequate management of potential
pan-European banking crises justi-
fies a high degree of engagement
by principals. 
Until recently, it was acceptable to
downplay the importance of cross-
border prudential issues, but the
recent and likely future rise of pan-
European banks changes the
situation. If a major banking crisis,
triggered by events inside or out-
side the EU, catches Europe unpre-
pared, the risk would be an extra-
ordinarily costly outcome, possible
regulatory overreaction and the
rushed adoption of poorly prepared
reforms. Seen in its wider context,
swift and proactive adaptation of
financial stability arrangements in
response to the emergence of pan-
European banks is in the interest of
all market participants.
This policy brief was informed by dis-
cussions held during the conference
‘Putting Europe’s Money to Work:
Financial Integration, Financial
Development and Growth in the
European Union’ jointly organised by
the International Monetary Fund and
Bruegel, on 21-22 February 2007 in
Brussels. 
The author expresses gratitude to all
those who provided input for this
policy brief and reviewed the draft.
He warmly thanks Martín Saldías
Zambrana for outstanding research
assistance.
‘Given the magnitude of
the challenges, an
evolutionary approach
is unlikely to deliver. ’